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emoglu and Johnson (2007) estimate the effea b s t r a c t
We analyze the short and long-run effects of demographic ageing – increased longevity
and reduced fertility – on per-capita growth. The OLG model captures direct effects,
working through adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, and capital deepening,
and indirect effects, working through changes of taxes, government spending compo-
nents and the retirement age in politico-economic equilibrium. Growth is driven by
capital accumulation and productivity increases fueled by public investment. The
closed-form solutions of the model predict taxation and the retirement age in OECD
economies to increase in response to demographic ageing and per-capita growth to
accelerate. If the retirement age was held constant, the growth rate in politico-
economic equilibrium would essentially remain unchanged, due to a surge of social-
security transfers and crowding out of public investment.
& 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The prospect of ‘‘graying’’ populations in many developed economies raises concerns about the sustainability of
economic growth. According to these concerns, rising old-age dependency ratios translate into growing tax burdens while
generous pension and health care beneﬁts crowd out public investment spending for infrastructure or education, with
negative effects for capital accumulation and productivity growth. However, the demographic transition has been ongoing
for a while – developed economies have experienced a marked decrease in fertility and increase in longevity for several
decades – without producing clear evidence that this transition has caused a fall in per-capita growth. Rather to the
opposite, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) ﬁnd in growth regressions that both a decrease in the fertility rate and an
increase in longevity are associated with higher growth rates.1ll rights reserved.
x: þ41 31 7803100.
z-Eiras), dirk.niepelt@szgerzensee.ch (D. Niepelt).
ve rise to a temporary reduction in the (young age) dependency ratio, generating a ‘‘demographic
, this growth dividend is predicted to be exhausted around the year 2010 (e.g., Bloom et al., 2003).
ct of life expectancy at birth on economic growth. They ﬁnd no evidence of a positive effect.
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Fig. 1. Public expenditure on pensions, percent of GDP.
Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), OECD.
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Fig. 2. Public expenditure on education and infrastructure investment, percent of GDP.
Source: Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000), OECD.
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elderly has increased, the share of public investment does not show a clear trend in most countries, see Figs. 1 and 2.2,3
Moreover, most developed countries have started to increase the retirement age or tighten the conditions for early
retirement, reducing the pressure on social-security taxes.
To interpret this data and gauge likely future developments, we develop a tractable model to analyze the effects of
demographic ageing on government budgets and per-capita growth. Building on a standard overlapping generations setup
with private and public capital formation sustaining endogenous growth, our framework features two demographic
driving forces – fertility and longevity – and a number of economic and political choices. In their role as economic agents,
households in the model take prices, taxes, public investment, the retirement age and retirement beneﬁts as given when
choosing consumption, savings, and labor supply. In their role as voters, households choose among ofﬁce motivated parties
that offer policy platforms comprising labor income taxes, the expenditure shares for intergenerational transfers and
public investment (reﬂecting spending components of central importance for developed economies), as well as the
retirement age. The political process lacks commitment, and elections take place every period.
Policy choices in the model are of different concern to young and old voters: the exposure of households to labor income
taxes changes over the life cycle; the old beneﬁt from social-security transfers to their group but are hurt by an increase in the
retirement age; and only the young beneﬁt from the returns to public investment. When evaluating the policy platforms on
offer in the political arena, voters therefore disagree as to which platform should ideally be implemented. We model the
resolution of the ensuing conﬂict under the assumption of probabilistic voting, reﬂecting a small degree of randomness in
voters’ support for a party. In equilibrium, vote-seeking parties propose a policy platform maximizing average welfare of all
voters, and changes in the economic or demographic environment give rise to a gradual adjustment of the policy instruments.
Policy choices do not only affect economic outcomes. Absent commitment, they also affect, indirectly, future policy
decisions. In addition to the ‘‘economic’’ repercussions of their policy choices, voters internalize the ‘‘political’’
repercussions, reﬂected in the equilibrium relationship between future state variables and policy choices. We assume2 Data is taken from Tanzi and Schuknecht (2000) and OECD sources (Society at a Glance, 2009, old-age cash beneﬁts, disability pensions and
survivors’ pensions; Economic Outlook, 2008, government ﬁxed capital formation; Education At a Glance, 2008, direct public expenditure plus subsidies to
households and other private entities). The GDP share of infrastructure investment has fallen in some countries, in contrast to the GDP share of education
spending. In this paper, we do not analyze the composition of public investment.
3 In cross-section data for the United States, the fraction of elderly residents in a district was negatively associated with education spending per child
(Poterba, 1997).
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sustaining trigger strategy equilibria. While we agree that the existence of intergenerational transfers or public investment
may also owe to reputational arrangements, we focus on the Markov perfect equilibrium in order to identify the
fundamental and robust forces that shape the size of these programs, and therefore growth.4
Under standard functional form assumptions, we characterize the politico-economic equilibrium in closed form.5
Changes in the demographic structure affect the equilibrium allocation both directly and indirectly, by inducing policy
changes. The direct effect of changes in fertility and longevity works through modiﬁed private savings and labor-supply
decisions which in equilibrium manifest themselves in faster capital accumulation. Indirectly, demographic ageing affects
growth because it alters the relative political power of the old and the effect of later retirement on aggregate labor supply.
At the same time, higher longevity increases the political support for public investment.
To quantify the equilibrium implications of demographic ageing, we analyze calibrated versions of the model
representing a rich OECD economy, a rich European OECD economy, the United States, and Japan. For each of the
countries and country blocks, the model predicts that the forecasted demographic changes give rise to a continued
increase of the GDP share of social-security transfers, a slightly higher GDP share of public investment, a strong increase of
the retirement age, and a rise in per-capita growth. In particular, annual per-capita growth is predicted to accelerate by
approximately 35 basis points toward the end of the century.
Importantly, these ﬁndings hinge on the assumption that both ﬁscal policy and the retirement age are endogenous.
With constant policy instruments, the growth rate would increase more strongly than in politico-economic equilibrium.
With endogenous tax rates and budget shares but a ﬁxed retirement age, the per-capita growth rate would essentially
remain stuck at its current level in the medium run and increase only slightly in the long run, due to a surge of social-
security transfers and – most importantly – crowding out of public investment.
The central predictions of the model are robust to a variety of changes in the modeling assumptions. In particular, the
results do not change if capital income taxes in addition to labor income taxes are introduced or if the balanced-budget
assumption is relaxed. The results are also robust to replacing the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation by one of exogenous
growth. In the model, the political process does not internalize the long-term beneﬁts of public investment because these
occur beyond the lifetimes of even the youngest voters. As a consequence, the exact speciﬁcation of productivity growth has
no effect on the evolution of the policy instruments and the government budget shares in politico-economic equilibrium.
Moreover, as we show, it does not have a strong effect on the evolution of output per capita in the medium run either.
While broadly consistent with the evidence, the model predictions contradict the common view among policy makers
that the political process will implement measures to raise productivity in order to ‘‘outgrow’’ the burden imposed by
demographic change.6 According to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public
investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main positive growth effects arise directly while the net
effect of endogenous policy on growth is negative.
Our work relates to the literature analyzing the effects of government policy on growth, see Barro (1990), Jones et al.
(1993) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) for a review. Our contribution relative to these papers lies in modeling the
determinants of policy and linking fertility and longevity to growth.7 Galor and Weil (1999), Cervellati and Sunde (2005)
and Soares (2005) analyze the growth effects of demographic change due to its impact on private savings and education
decisions, and Hazan (2009) introduces private retirement decisions in a model of human capital accumulation. Our model
complements these papers by modeling the role of policy and its determinants in politico-economic equilibrium, and by
focusing on the ongoing demographic transition in developed economies rather than historical developments.
Our work also relates to politico-economic models of redistribution and growth. Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and
Tabellini (1994) and Krusell et al. (1997) argue that inequality depresses growth because anticipated redistributive taxation
reduces the incentive to accumulate, or because higher inequality pushes the median voter’s preferred level of public invest-
ment and taxes beyond the growth-maximizing level. Relative to these papers, we focus on inter- rather than intragenera-
tional conﬂict, consider a larger set of policy instruments available to policy makers, and focus on the implications of fertility
and longevity on growth. Our analysis therefore sheds light on the equilibrium size and composition of the government
budget, and it emphasizes how demographic ageing affects both this composition and growth.8,9
Like Bellettini and Berti Ceroni (1999) and Rangel (2003), our paper analyzes the choice of productive versus
redistributive public spending in an overlapping-generations model. In these papers, voters support public investment
even if they do not directly beneﬁt from it because a trigger strategy links investment spending to the provision of public
pensions in the future. Our model adopts a different perspective. Rather than emphasizing complementarities between
investment spending and transfer payments, it focuses on the conﬂict over the size of these two spending components, and4 For a discussion of Markov perfect equilibrium see Krusell et al. (1997).
5 Our functional form assumptions imply a minimal amount of strategic interaction between policy makers in different periods.
6 See, for example, the discussions surrounding the European Union’s ‘‘Lisbon Agenda.’’
7 Azzimonti et al. (2009) analyze capital formation by a benevolent government without commitment in a representative agent economy.
8 Our work shares with Krusell et al. (1997) the restriction to Markov perfect equilibrium. Methodologically, it is related to Gonzalez-Eiras and
Niepelt (2008).
9 Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Perotti (1993) analyze distributive conﬂict in models with human capital accumulation. They focus on the
political choice of public versus private education and the effect of distortive redistribution in the presence of borrowing constraints, respectively.
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features political and economic choices, embedded in the standard growth model. This allows us to model the
macroeconomic consequences of population ageing in a rich setting without having to sacriﬁce analytical tractability.
Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) argue that public investment might rise in response to increased longevity. Our model
incorporates the mechanism underlying Gradstein and Kaganovich’s (2004) argument. In addition, it features a role for
fertility, the retirement age, a second government spending component that competes for funding, and – central to our
analysis – growth effects of policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and characterizes the allocation
conditional on policy. Section 3 solves for the politico-economic equilibrium and analyzes its properties. Section 4 contains
the analysis of the short and long-run effects of demographic ageing on government budgets and macroeconomic
outcomes, in particular the growth rate. Section 5 concludes.
2. Economic environment
We consider an economy inhabited by two-period lived overlapping generations: young households and old households.
Young households in period t supply labor, pay taxes, consume and save for retirement. They face idiosyncratic longevity
risk: with probability ptþ1 2 ð0,1, they survive to become old households in period tþ1. Old households in turn consume
the return on their savings, old-age beneﬁts and the proceeds of their labor income in old age. The size of this labor income
depends on the retirement age, Rt , and the labor productivity of old relative to young workers, wZ0.
10 If Rt ¼ 0 or w¼ 0, the
effective per-capita labor supply of old households equals zero. Old households die at the end of the period.
Each cohort consists of a continuum of homogeneous agents. The ratio of young to old households in period t equals nt=pt ,
reﬂecting the gross rate of growth of the number of young households nt (nt40), fertility for short, and longevity pt.11 Both
these demographic parameters follow deterministic processes. On a balanced-growth path, the survival probability is
constant at value p and the gross population growth rate is given by n. Savings of young households who die before reaching
old age are distributed among their surviving peers, reﬂecting a perfect annuities market.
2.1. Technology
A continuum of competitive ﬁrms transforms capital and labor into output by means of a Cobb–Douglas technology.
Capital depreciates after one period. The capital stock per young household, kt, therefore corresponds to the per-capita
savings of young households in the previous period, st1, divided by the growth rate of the number of young workers, nt .
We normalize the period time endowment to unity and denote leisure consumption of the young and labor productivity by
xt and Ht, respectively. Labor supply by an old worker in period t equals Rtð1xtÞ reﬂecting the assumption that young and
non-retired old households work the same number of hours.12 Labor supply per young household in period t is then given
by ctðRtÞð1xtÞ with ctðRtÞ  1þRtwpt=nt . Output per young household in period t is given by
B0k
a
t ½HtctðRtÞð1xtÞ1a,
where B040 and the capital share a 2 ð0,1Þ.
Production factors are paid their marginal products, due to perfect competition. The wage per unit of time, wt, and the
gross return on physical capital, Rt, therefore satisfy
wt ¼ ð1aÞB0H1at kat ½ctðRtÞð1xtÞa,
Rt ¼ aB0H1at ka1t ½ctðRtÞð1xtÞ1a ¼wt
ctðRtÞð1xtÞ
kt
a0,
with a0  a=ð1aÞ. As a consequence of annuitization, the gross return on savings of a young household that survives to old
age equals R^t  Rt=pt .
Labor productivity Ht reﬂects productive public investment during previous periods.
13 More speciﬁcally, productivity
growth is a function of public investment per young household,
Htþ1 ¼ B1H1dt Idt ,
with B140, d 2 ð0,1Þ and It denoting investment spending per young household. A speciﬁcation of this type is standard in
the literature.1410 To be precise, Rt equals the fraction of the period that an old household is required to work.
11 Net immigration also affects the rate of growth of the number of young households.
12 This assumption is not restrictive as changes in the hours worked by old households may be undone by changes in the retirement age.
13 Due to the Cobb–Douglas speciﬁcation of the production function in the ﬁnal good sector, Ht can equivalently be interpreted as the total factor
productivity. Since our objective is to analyze the link between changes in the size and composition of the population on the one hand and productivity
growth on the other, we do not allow for scale effects as they are sometimes considered in endogenous-growth models.
14 For example, Boldrin and Montes (2005) use the above speciﬁcation (which is a special case of Rebelo, 1991), with Ht interpreted as human capital
and It interpreted as public education.
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The government taxes the labor income of young households in period t at rate ttþst . Revenues fund transfers to
retired old households – the component corresponding to tt – as well as public investment – the component
corresponding to st .
Denoting the total transfer to an old household by bt, we have
15
bt ¼wtð1xtÞttnt=pt ,
It ¼wtð1xtÞst :
Public investment It, the transfer payment bt and the retirement age must be non-negative (we exclude lump-sum
taxes). The policy instruments therefore have to satisfy16
tt ,st ,RtZ0 for all t: ð1Þ
We denote a combination of the policy instruments in period t by kt , kt  ðtt ,st ,RtÞ.
Note that we abstract from capital income taxes and impose a balanced-budget restriction. Both assumptions are
without loss of generality. As discussed in the working paper version (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2007), a capital income
tax rate would equal zero in equilibrium since, from the perspective of political decision makers who set policy
instruments ex post, capital income taxes and old-age transfers are close substitutes.17 Similarly, old-age transfers and
the repayment of government debt are close substitutes as well, rendering a balanced-budget restriction non-restrictive
(see the discussion in Section 5).2.3. Preferences
Young households value consumption during young age, c1, and in old age, c2, as well as leisure. Agents discount the
future at factor b 2 ð0,1Þ. Due to the risk of death, the effective discount factor of young households equals bptþ1. For
analytical tractability, we assume that the period utility functions of consumption and leisure are logarithmic. Maximizing
expected utility, a worker in period t solves the following problem:
max
st ,xt
lnðc1,tÞþmlnðxtÞþbptþ1½lnðc2,tþ1Þþmlnð1Rtþ1ð1xtþ1ÞÞ
s:t: c1,t ¼wtð1xtÞð1ttstÞst ,
c2,tþ1 ¼ stR^tþ1þwtþ1ð1xtþ1ÞwRtþ1þbtþ1,
where mZ0 characterizes the preference for leisure. Note that the treatment of leisure is symmetric over the life cycle.
Leisure consumption during old age equals the difference between the time endowment, 1, and the time spent working
which reﬂects the intensive and extensive (retirement) margins of labor supply.2.4. Economic equilibrium
The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing the households’ savings and labor-supply decisions, respectively, are standard:
1
c1,t
¼ bptþ1R^tþ1
1
c2,tþ1
,
m
xt
¼wtð1ttstÞ 1
c1,t
:
Substituting, the Euler equation characterizing the optimal savings choice of an individual household is given by
stR^tþ1þwtþ1ð1xtþ1ÞwRtþ1þbtþ1
bptþ1R^tþ1
¼wtð1xtÞð1ttstÞst :
Using st1Rt=nt ¼wtctðRtÞð1xtÞa0, simplifying the left-hand side of the equation and setting individual and average
savings equal to each other, we ﬁnd the aggregate savings function
st ¼ ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1Þwtð1xtÞð1ttstÞ,15 The transfer received while actually retired is wtð1xtÞttnt=ðptð1RtÞÞ. The total transfer received during old age is the product of this expression
and 1Rt . Alternative normalizations do not affect the results.
16 We suppress the upper bound of unity on the retirement age since it will not be binding.
17 In the presence of within-cohort heterogeneity, this need no longer be the case.
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ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1Þ 
ab
að1þbptþ1Þ=ptþ1þ 1actþ 1ðRtþ 1Þ
ttþ 1
ptþ 1
þwRtþ 1ntþ 1
 Z0:
Note that the savings rate in period t depends on policy choices in period tþ1. (If ttþ140 or wRtþ140, old households
receive retirement beneﬁts or labor income in addition to the return on their savings. This renders the savings rate
endogenous to policy, even with logarithmic preferences.) If these policy instruments themselves depend on aggregate
savings, then the above relation characterizes savings only implicitly. We return to this point when discussing the
objective function maximized in the political process.
Combining the ﬁrst-order condition for leisure with the expression for c1,t yields
xt ¼
mð1ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1ÞÞ
1þmð1ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1ÞÞ
: ð2Þ
Note that labor supply is independent of contemporaneous taxes as income and substitution effects cancel.
The endogenous state variables at time t are Ht and kt. To simplify notation, we work with the state variables Ht and
qt H1at kat instead. Let Lt  B0ð1aÞqtð1xtÞ1actðRtÞa ¼wtð1xtÞ denote labor income of a young household. Combining
kt ¼ st1=nt and the aggregate savings function with the dynamic budget constraint and the expressions for factor prices,
the equilibrium allocation can recursively be expressed in terms of the following functions of state variables and policy
instruments:
ktþ1 ¼Ltð1ttstÞztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1Þ=ntþ1 ¼ st=ntþ1,
c1,t ¼Ltð1ttstÞð1ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1ÞÞ,
c2,t ¼Ltnt a0ctðRtÞ

ptþtt
pt
þwRt
nt
 
,
xt ¼
mð1ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1ÞÞ
1þmð1ztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1ÞÞ
,
Htþ1 ¼ B1H1dt ðLtstÞd,
qtþ1 ¼ ðB1H1dt ðLtstÞdÞ1aðLtð1ttstÞztþ1ðttþ1,Rtþ1Þ=ntþ1Þa:
9>>>>>>>=
>>>>>>>;
ð3Þ
Conditional on initial values for the two endogenous state variables, ðH0,q0Þ, as well as a sequence of policy instruments,
fktg1t ¼ 0, conditions (3) fully characterize the equilibrium allocation. Taking logarithms, we can express the laws of motion
of the two endogenous state variables as
lnðHtþ1Þ
lnðqtþ1Þ
" #
¼
1d d
ð1aÞð1dÞ aþdð1aÞ
" #
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 M
lnðHtÞ
lnðqtÞ
" #
þ x
H
t ðÞ
xqt ðÞ
" #
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
 xt
ð4Þ
where the deﬁnitions of xHt ðst ,Rt ,ttþ1,Rtþ1Þ and xqt ðtt ,st ,Rt ,ttþ1,Rtþ1Þ follow from (3).
In the special case with inelastic labor supply, m¼ 0, the equilibrium (3) maintain their validity and xt¼0.
2.5. Balanced growth path
Along a balanced-growth path, all tax rates and demographic variables are constant, implying that labor supply is time-
invariant as well. From (3), the growth rates of kt ,st ,c1,t , and c2,t then are equal to the growth rate of qt. The laws of motion
for the two endogenous state variables in (3) imply that, along the balanced-growth path, the gross growth rate of Ht, gH ,
equals the gross growth rate of qt. For any time-invariant choice of tax rates, the last two equations in (3) therefore pin
down the ratio Ht=qt on the corresponding balanced-growth path. Given this ratio, the same two conditions pin down gH
and thus, the balanced-growth rates of qt ,kt ,st ,c1,t , and c2,t:
gH ¼ B0cðRÞað1aÞð1xÞ1a
 d
B1a1 ð1tsÞ
zðt,RÞ
n
 ad
sdð1aÞ
 !1=1að1dÞ
s:t: ð2Þ: ð5Þ
Gross population growth n has a direct negative effect on per-capita growth because it reduces the capital stock per
young household for a given savings rate (the effect captured by n in the denominator), and a positive effect because it
reduces total labor supply and increases wages given the stock of capital per young household (the effect captured by the
term cðRÞa). Longevity has a direct negative effect on growth by increasing the total labor supply and reducing wages
given the stock of capital per young household (the effect captured by the term cðRÞa, again). In addition, changes in
fertility and longevity affect the savings rate and thus also labor supply of young households.
Income taxes depress growth because they lower disposable income of young households (the effect captured by the
term 1ts), as do retirement beneﬁts because they lower the savings rate (zðÞ is decreasing in t). At the same time,
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(e.g., Blankenau et al., 2007). Later retirement has a negative effect on growth. It lowers the wages of workers (the effect
captured by cðRÞa) and also decreases the savings rate.
In the following, we sometimes write the growth rate as gHððp,nÞ,kðp,nÞÞ to indicate that demographic change affects growth
both directly and indirectly, by altering the choice of policy instruments kt . Growth theory commonly analyzes the direct effect
of demographic change on growth, @gHððp,nÞ,kÞ=@ðp,nÞ, or the direct effect of policy on growth, @gHððp,nÞ,kÞ=@k. Our objective is
to analyze the combined direct and indirect effects of demographic change on growth, dgHððp,nÞ,kðp,nÞÞ=dðp,nÞ. In Section 4, we
quantitatively assess these effects for advanced OECD economies.
Physical capital along the long-run growth path satisﬁes ktþ1 ¼Ltð1tsÞzðt,RÞ=n. Since kt grows at the gross rate gH , it
follows that
Ht
kt
 1a
¼ gHn
B0cðRÞað1aÞð1xÞ1að1tsÞ zðt,RÞ
s:t: ð2Þ,
R¼ acðRÞgHnð1aÞð1tsÞzðt,RÞ s:t: ð2Þ:
2.6. Exogenous growth speciﬁcation
The recent growth literature supports the notion that technology diffusion or trade linkages work toward an
equalization of growth rates across regions and countries (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 2009, Chapter 18). In the context of our
model, technology diffusion across countries can be modeled by positing that a country’s growth rate of H does not only
depend on public investment in that country, but also on investment or productivity growth in other countries. For
example, one may posit that
Htþ1 ¼ B1H
ð1eÞð1dÞ
t H
eð1dÞ
t I
d
t ,
where 0reo1 and Ht denotes productivity in the rest of the world. (The model analyzed so far corresponds to the case
e¼ 1.) To the extent that ‘‘foreign’’ productivity growth is exogenous, ‘‘domestic’’ long-term productivity growth is
exogenous as well. In particular, domestic growth dynamics may then be modeled by a closed-economy speciﬁcation,
Htþ1 ¼ B1,tHeð1dÞt Idt ,
where growth of H, k and q at rate gH is sustained by exogenous growth of B1,t at the rate gB1 ¼ g
ð1dÞð1eÞ
H .
In this exogenous-growth speciﬁcation, the equations for ktþ1, c1,t and c2,t in (3) remain valid while the law of motion
for the state variables in (4) changes to
lnðHtþ1Þ
lnðqtþ1Þ
" #
¼
eð1dÞ d
eð1aÞð1dÞ aþdð1aÞ
" #
lnðHtÞ
lnðqtÞ
" #
þxt , ð6Þ
where xt differs from the corresponding expression in the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation insofar as B1,t increases over
time. The equilibrium expressions for Ht=kt and R given above still apply.
3. Politico-economic equilibrium
We assume that young and old households vote on candidates whose electoral platforms specify values for the policy
instruments, kt . Voters do not only support a candidate for her policy platform, but also for other characteristics
(‘‘ideology’’) that are orthogonal to the fundamental policy dimensions of interest. These characteristics are permanent and
cannot be credibly altered in the course of electoral competition. Moreover, their valuation differs across voters (even if
voters agree about the preferred policy platform) and is subject to random aggregate shocks, realized after candidates have
chosen their platforms. This ‘‘probabilistic-voting’’ setup renders the probability of winning a voter’s support a continuous
function of the competing policy platforms, implying that equilibrium policy platforms smoothly respond to changes in
the demographic structure. This stands in contrast to the ‘‘median-voter’’ setup where, in a model with only a few
generations, a small change in the demographic structure has large effects on policy outcomes if it alters the cohort the
median voter is associated with.
In the Nash equilibrium of the probabilistic-voting game with two candidates choosing platforms to maximize their
expected vote shares, both candidates propose the same policy platform.18 This platform maximizes a convex combination
of the objective functions of all groups of voters, where the weights reﬂect the groups’ size and sensitivity of voting
behavior to policy changes. Those groups that care the most about policy platforms rather than other candidate
characteristics are the most likely to shift their support from one candidate to the other in response to small changes18 See Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for discussions of the probabilistic-voting setup.
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their own favor. If all voters are equally responsive to changes in the policy platforms, electoral competition implements
the utilitarian optimum with respect to voters.
Owing to political competition at the beginning of each period, policy makers cannot commit to future policy platforms.
Voters therefore have to form expectations about the effect of current policy choices on future policy outcomes. Under
the Markov assumption, future leisure and policy choices are functions of the fundamental state variables only,
xtþ1 ¼ ~xtþ1ðHtþ1,qtþ1Þ and ktþ1 ¼ ~ktþ1ðHtþ1,qtþ1Þ. (The state variables include demographic variables, thus the time
indices of the policy functions.) If the policy functions are independent of ðH,qÞ, ktþ1 ¼ ~ktþ1, then (2) implies that the
leisure function is independent of ðH,qÞ as well, xtþ1 ¼ ~xtþ1, and both the aggregate savings function and the economic
equilibrium (3) apply (recall the discussion of the aggregate savings function in Section 2.4). In the following, we
conjecture that the policy functions indeed are independent of ðH,qÞ. We derive the equilibrium choice of policy
instruments under this conjecture and show that this choice does not depend on ðH,qÞ, thereby verifying the conjecture.
The political objective function, WtðÞ, depends on the endogenous state variables (as well as the exogenous ones, thus
the time index), the contemporaneous policy instruments, and the anticipated values of policy instruments and leisure in
the following period. Letting o denote the per-capita political inﬂuence of old relative to young households, we deﬁne
WtðHt ,qt ,kt ; ~ktþ1, ~xtþ1Þ optflnðc2,tÞþmlnð1Rtð1xtÞÞgþntflnðc1,tÞþmlnðxtÞ
þbptþ1½lnðc2,tþ1Þþmlnð1Rtþ1ð1xtþ1ÞÞg
s:t: ð3Þ, ktþ1 ¼ ~ktþ1,xtþ1 ¼ ~xtþ1:
The program characterizing equilibrium policy choices in period t is given by
max
kt
WtðHt ,qt ,kt ; ~ktþ1, ~xtþ1Þ s:t: ð1Þ, Ht ,qt given:
Political equilibrium requires that for any combination of state variables ðHt ,qtÞ, the kt solving this program is given by ~kt .
Using the equilibrium expressions for consumption from (3), the objective function can be expressed as
WtðÞ ¼opt ln ctðRtÞa a0ctðRtÞ=ptþ
tt
pt
þ wRt
nt
  	
þmlnð1Rtð1xtÞÞ

 
þntfln½ctðRtÞað1ttstÞ
þbptþ1ln½ðctðRtÞaÞdð1aÞþað1ttstÞasdð1aÞt gþt:i:p: s:t: ð2Þ,
where t.i.p. denotes terms that are unaffected by contemporaneous policy choices (under the conjecture), due to the
logarithmic preference assumption. In particular, t:i:p: includes Ht and qt and, with an exogenous-growth speciﬁcation, the
parameter e determining the strength of the intertemporal spillover from H. Since the contemporaneous policy
instruments do not interact with the state variables Ht or qt, the equilibrium policy functions are independent of these
state variables, conﬁrming the initial conjecture.19 Similarly, since in the case with an exogenous-growth speciﬁcation the
parameter e does not interact with the policy instruments, the equilibrium policy choices in the endogenous and
exogenous-growth speciﬁcations of the model coincide. This is a reﬂection of the fact that the political process does not
internalize the long-term beneﬁts of public investment because these occur beyond the lifetimes of even the youngest
voters.
Letting Dtþ1  1þbptþ1ðaþdð1aÞÞ denote the semi-elasticity of young households’ utility with respect to labor
income, the ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to tt , st and Rt , respectively, read
opt
nt
1
pt
a0ctðRtÞ=ptþttpt þ
wRt
nt
þlt ¼ 1þabptþ1
1ttst
,
dð1aÞbptþ1
st
þls ¼ 1þabptþ1
1ttst
,
opt
nt
a0c0tðRtÞ=ptþw=nt
a0ctðRtÞ=ptþttpt þ
wRt
nt
 mð1xtÞð1Rtð1xtÞÞ
 !
þlR ¼ ac
0
tðRtÞ
ctðRtÞ
opt
nt
þDtþ1
 
,
where the ls denote multipliers associated with the non-negativity constraints on the policy instruments.
If the tax rates tt and st are interior (as is the case in the data and in the simulations we conduct later) and Rt is in a
corner then we can solve the former two ﬁrst-order conditions for
tt ¼
opt
nt a0Dtþ1
opt
nt þDtþ1
,19 In related work, we analyze the sensitivity of a parallel result to changes in functional form assumptions (Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005). We
ﬁnd that, in the case of generalized CRRA preferences, state variables and policy instruments do interact. However, the quantitative implications for
equilibrium policies are negligible.
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1
opt
nt þDtþ1
,
implying that tax rates in period t depend on demographics in periods t and tþ1.
If the three instruments have an interior solution, solving the ﬁrst-order conditions yields
tt ¼
ð1aÞ optnt þDtþ1
 
þoptnt mDtþ1 1þ
wpt
nt ð1xt Þ
 
ð1aÞ optnt þDtþ1
 
þoptnt m
,
st ¼ bdptþ1
ð1aÞ 1þ wptnt ð1xtÞ
 
ð1aÞ optnt þDtþ1
 
þoptnt m
,
Rt ¼
ð1aÞ optnt þDtþ1
 .
ð1xtÞowm
ð1aÞ optnt þDtþ1
 
þoptnt m
:
Since xt is a function of future policy choices (see (2)) it appears that, in this case, the policy instruments effectively depend
on current and all future demographic shocks. This is not the case, however, because the combination of policy
instruments entering into the expression for labor supply20 in period t does not depend on 1xtþ1 but only on parameters
and demographic shocks in periods tþ1 and tþ2:
1xt ¼ 1
m
1þmþbptþ1 1þDtþ 2ntþ 1optþ 1
 
a
:
Accordingly, the equilibrium policy choices kt only depend on parameters and demographic shocks in periods t through tþ2.
Demographic change affects the policy instruments through several channels. (Unless otherwise noted, the compara-
tive statics results for tt and st hold even if Rt is in a corner or ﬁxed.) First, by altering the relative political power of the old
in the current period, opt=nt . Higher relative political power of the old (reﬂecting a higher number of old relative to young
households due to lower fertility or higher longevity in the previous period) raises tt and lowers st and Rt .
21 Intuitively,
more powerful elderly voters secure higher intergenerational transfers and earlier retirement. Because taxes are distorting,
funding for other government outlays is reduced.
Second, demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering the effect of later retirement on aggregate labor
supply, wpt=nt . A stronger such effect (reﬂecting a higher number of old relative to young households, again) reduces tt and
increases st and Rt . Intuitively, a higher number of old relative to young households strengthens the extent to which an
increase in the retirement age translates into available resources. The additional resources generated due to later retirement
reduce the need for intergenerational transfers and limit tax distortions. This allows to increase funding for public
investment. The combined effect of the ﬁrst two channels (reﬂecting the number of old relative to young households in the
current period) is to raise tt and Rt and lower st in response to demographic ageing. That is, the retirement age rises during
the demographic transition although the relative political power of the old increases when society ages.
Third, demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering the longevity of young households, ptþ1, and thus,
the weight the political process attaches to the future (see also Gradstein and Kaganovich, 2004). With a higher such
weight, public investment becomes easier to sustain politically. As a consequence, an increase in longevity reduces tt but
increases st and Rt .
Finally, with an interior retirement age, future demographic change affects the policy instruments by altering policy
choices in the subsequent period and thus contemporaneous labor supply. In particular, increases in ptþ1,ntþ1 and ptþ2 all
raise 1xt .22 Higher contemporaneous labor supply in turn increases tt and reduces st and Rt . Intuitively, higher
contemporaneous labor supply raises the disutility of later retirement for the old; as a consequence, the retirement age is
reduced, transfers increased, and public investment falls.
The comparative statics results working through the ﬁrst channel correspond with conventional wisdom. Often
overlooked are the consequences of the other channels, as well as the fact that their interaction generates non-monotone
dynamics. For example, a permanent shock to longevity may give rise to a fall in the tax rate t in the period preceding the20 This combination is given by
1a
ctþ1ðRtþ1Þ
ttþ1
ptþ1
þ wRtþ1ntþ1
 
,
see Eq. (2).
21 We interpret the ratio o=w as opt=nt=wpt=nt .
22 Recall from (2) that xt ¼m=ð1þmþbptþ1Þ if ttþ1 ¼ Rtþ1 ¼ 0. That is, absent transfer or labor income in old age, higher longevity increases labor
supply because it raises the savings rate of young households. The additional term in the equilibrium expression for labor supply, ð1þDtþ2ntþ1=optþ1Þa,
arises because ttþ1 and Rtþ1 differ from zero in politico-economic equilibrium, with the equilibrium size of these instruments determined by Dtþ2 and
optþ1=ntþ1 (see the discussion above).
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power of the old). In response to the same shock, the tax rate s may display the opposite dynamics while the retirement
age rises both in the short and the long run. Before the background of these non-monotone dynamics, data about the short-
run evolution of government budget shares cannot easily be extrapolated to predict the direction of long-run change in
these shares.23
The equilibrium policy functions kt are unique in the limit of the ﬁnite horizon economy. To see this, consider the ﬁnal
period T and note that labor supply is inelastic in this ﬁnal period (from (2)). The political objective function in period T
therefore depends on the consumption of young and old households,
c1,T ¼LT ð1tT Þ and c2,T ¼LTnT ða
0 þ1ÞcT ðRT ÞþtT1
pT
 
,
respectively. Note that sT ¼ 0 since there is no beneﬁt of public investment in the ﬁnal period. Differentiating the political
objective function in period T with respect to tT and RT yields two equations in the policy instruments that are
independent of ðHT ,qT Þ. This implies that kT is not a function of ðHT ,qT Þ. Moving to period T1, the forgoing analysis shows
that the policy functions kT1 are independent of ðHT1,qT1Þ as well, and given by the equilibrium expressions reported
earlier. The result then follows by induction.
In Appendix A, we derive as a criterion for production efﬁciency along a balanced-growth path the requirement that
1Za0 I
s
4d:
If either of the two inequalities is violated then a reallocation of investment spending between I and smay weakly increase
output in all future periods, and strictly in some (see Cass, 1972). In particular, if the left inequality is violated, the
economy accumulates too much H and if the right inequality is violated, the economy accumulates too much k. As shown
in Appendix A, the economy necessarily over accumulates k relative to H in politico-economic equilibrium. As a
consequence, the allocation in politico-economic equilibrium necessarily differs from the allocation supported by any
Ramsey policy.24
4. Quantitative implications of demographic ageing
Based on the analytical results derived earlier, we compute quantitative predictions for a synthetic ‘‘rich OECD
economy,’’ representing the population weighted average of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States; a synthetic ‘‘rich European OECD economy,’’
representing the population weighted average of the European countries in the above list; the United States; and Japan.
We take one period in the model to correspond to 30 years in the data. Accordingly, we compute three sequences of model
predictions with a period length of 30 years each. In the ﬁrst sequence, the periods correspond to the years 1970, 2000,
2030,y; in the second sequence, to the years 1980, 2010, 2040,y; and in the third sequence, to the years 1990, 2020,
2050,y. When reporting time series predictions, we list the three sequences in a single time series.
We use the 30-year population growth rate as a measure of nt , the number of young households in period t relative to
the number in the preceding period. For pt, the number of old households in period t relative to the number of young
households in the preceding period, we use estimates for life expectancy at age 65 divided by 30 years.25 Figs. 3 and 4 plot
the demographic series underlying the model predictions.
We set a to 0.3, a standard value in the literature, normalize B0 to unity, and let w¼ 1:135, based on estimates of labor
productivity over the life cycle in Heathcote et al. (2010).26 To calibrate b,d,o,B1 and m, we impose model restrictions.
First, we ﬁx the GDP-shares of transfers and public investment in the year 2000, ð1aÞt2000 and ð1aÞs2000, respectively, at
the values 0.0796 and 0.0727, the corresponding averages in the rich OECD economy.27 Second, we ﬁx the balanced-23 The comparative statics with respect to the structural parameters of the model are intuitive. For example, an increase in the preference for leisure,
m, raises the marginal cost of working for the old and induces the political process to reduce the retirement age and shift government spending from
investment to social-security beneﬁts. The effect working through changes in labor supply reinforces this adjustment. If the retirement age is ﬁxed,
changes in m do not affect the two tax rates. An increase in the elasticity of productivity growth to public investment, d, leads to a reduction of tt and an
increase in st and Rt .
24 With exogenous growth (eo1), the production inefﬁciency result remains valid, see Appendix A. The political process does not internalize the
dynamic externality from current to future H, in contrast to a Ramsey planner. As a consequence, the strength of this dynamic externality is irrelevant for
the equilibrium kt .
25 Demographic data from the year 1950 onward is taken from Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United
Nations Secretariat (2005, 2007): World Population Prospects, New York. Population data for the year 1940 is taken from http://www.populstat.info. Data
about life expectancy at age 65 is available up to the year 2000. Data for 2010–2050 is extrapolated from data about life expectancy at birth.
Demographic data for the year 2060 and later is extrapolated under the assumption that p and n converge to unity in the long run.
26 We ﬁt a polynomial to Heathcote et al. (2010) estimates for the United States and compute the average values before and after age 65.
27 We proxy the former by the GDP-share of old-age and survivors pensions and the latter by the GDP-share of government ﬁxed capital formation
and (other) government expenditures for education (all levels of government). Data is taken from OECD sources. (Due to data limitations, the components
underlying the historical shares reported in the Introduction differ slightly from the ones we choose for the calibration. In particular, the historical
pension-share series contains disability beneﬁts and the historical investment-share series may be slightly biased due to double counting.)
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Fig. 3. nt for the rich OECD economy (black, ‘‘o’’), the rich European OECD economy (red, ‘‘e’’), the United States (green, ‘‘u’’), and Japan (blue, ‘‘j’’). (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o o
o o
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e
e e
e e
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u
u u
u u
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j j
j j
1980 2000 2020 2040 2060 2080
t
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Fig. 4. pt for the rich OECD economy (black, ‘‘o’’), the rich European OECD economy (red, ‘‘e’’), the United States (green, ‘‘u’’), and Japan (blue, ‘‘j’’). (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
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rich OECD economy.28 Finally, we ﬁx the labor supply of a young household in the year 2000 at 1/3. These restrictions
imply b¼ 0:7226 (0.9892 on an annual basis), d¼ 0:4039, o¼ 1:8256, B1 ¼ 10:7738 and m¼2.7011.
Figs. 5–9 display the predicted policy responses to demographic change in the rich OECD economy, the rich European
OECD economy, the United States, and Japan. All simulations are based on the calibration described above and differ only
with respect to the demographic series fed into the model. As a consequence, the actual budget shares in the year 2000 are
exactly matched in the case of the rich OECD economy.
According to the model predictions displayed in Fig. 5, tt more than doubles in the rich OECD economy between the
years 1970 and 2000, ﬂattening out thereafter and increasing further by approximately three percentage points up to the
year 2080. Tax rate st increases much slower, rising by slightly more than two percentage points between the years 1970
and 2080. In sample, these predictions are broadly consistent with the evidence on public investment and intergenera-
tional transfers (see Figs. 1 and 2) although the model over predicts the speed with which social-security taxes increase.
Retirement age Rt in the model rises by an amount corresponding to roughly 6 years between 2000 and 2080, to be
compared with an increase in life expectancy at age 65 of more than 8 years. Labor supply of young households (not
displayed) rises by more than 1% between 1970 and 2000 and by another percent between 2000 and 2080. In contrast with
the savings rate of young households, the national savings rate (not displayed) is predicted to fall from more than 7% in
1970 to roughly 6% in 2010 and roughly 4% in 2080, due to the increased fraction of the elderly who are dissaving.
If the retirement age was not allowed to rise beyond its level in the year 2000, the tax rate tt would increase steeply
and st would decline, see Fig. 6. Intuitively, with a capped Rt the growing number of non-working old relative to young
households would require increasingly high social-security contributions per young household and the induced rise in tt
would render taxation more costly, triggering a fall in the tax rate st and crowding out of government investment.28 We calibrate gH based on the average annual multifactor productivity growth rate of the rich OECD economy between the years 1985 and 2005,
1.0113 (OECD sources), and R based on Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2008) estimate of the annual gross interest rate in the United States, 1.0483.
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mechanisms underlying such fears, it predicts a different resolution of intergenerational conﬂict because of adjustments
along the retirement margin.
Returning to the scenario where all three policy instruments are free to adjust, the predicted policy responses in the
rich European OECD economy, the United States and Japan are similar as far as the public investment share is concerned,
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Fig. 8. Predicted policies for the United States: tt (black), st (red), Rt (green). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader
is referred to the web version of this article.)
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M. Gonzalez-Eiras, D. Niepelt / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 97–115 109see Figs. 7–9. The main differences between the three economies concern the budget share for social-security transfers on
the one hand and the retirement age on the other: the social-security budget share in the United States and Japan starts
out from a lower level than in the rich European OECD economy but catches up during the early years of the simulation;
and the retirement age increases earlier in the rich European OECD economy and Japan than in the United States.
In broad terms, these predictions about the relative performance of the three countries and country blocks are
consistent with the evidence. In particular, the model predicts the GDP-share of social-security transfers in the year 2000,
ð1aÞt2000, to be highest in the rich European OECD economy (nearly 9%), followed by Japan and the United States (more
than 7%). In the data, the corresponding shares equal roughly 10%, 8%, and 6%, respectively. Similarly, the model correctly
predicts that the GDP-share of public investment, ð1aÞs2000, is higher in Japan than in the United States and the rich
European OECD economy: The model predicts GDP-shares of nearly 8% for Japan and more than 7% for the United States
and the rich European OECD economy, in line with the data. The model also performs well in predicting a sharp increase of
retirement age in Japan around the year 1990 and a smoother and later response in the United States.29 It performs less
satisfactory in predicting a robust increase of retirement age in the rich European OECD economy by the year 1990.30
Fig. 10 displays the predicted annual per-capita output growth rates for the four countries and country blocks under
consideration. These growth rates are reported as deviations from the balanced-growth rates subject to the year-200029 In 1994, Japan enacted a rapid increase of retirement age and a reduction of effective tax rates for workers close to retirement (Yashiro and Oshio,
1999). The model captures this rapid increase. In the United States, the retirement age started to increase around the year 2000, at a slower rate.
30 Empirically, it has only been recently that many European countries have moved toward delaying the statutory retirement age and reducing the
incentives for early retirement (e.g., Galasso, 2006, pp. 23–25), or to discussing proposals of such policy changes. This suggests that the model does not
capture certain institutional frictions that delay adjustment along the retirement margin, or other motives for changes in the retirement age. For
example, starting in the late 1960s and 1970s, early retirement provisions were introduced in many OECD countries in response to high levels of
unemployment among middle-aged workers (see, e.g., Conde-Ruiz and Galasso, 2004). Our framework is silent about these developments.
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increased by 30–35 basis points. The growth accelerations in the rich OECD economy, the rich European OECD economy
and the United States are very similar and slightly exceed the one in Japan. If the retirement age was capped at its level in
the year 2000 (such that tt would rise steeply and st decline), per-capita growth would essentially remain stuck at its
current level.
To understand the sources of these predicted growth effects, we compare the per-capita balanced-growth rate along the
initial balanced-growth path subject to year-2000 demographics with the one along a new balanced-growth path subject
to p% ¼ n% ¼ 1. Recall from the discussion in Section 2.5 that the total growth effect of demographic change can be
decomposed into a direct and an indirect, policy induced effect:
dgHððp,nÞ,kðp,nÞÞ
dðp,nÞ ¼
@gHððp,nÞ,kðp,nÞÞ
@ðp,nÞ þ
@gHððp,nÞ,kðp,nÞÞ
@k
@kðp,nÞ
@ðp,nÞ :
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side includes the direct effect of demographic change on economic growth as described in
Section 2.5. The second term includes the indirect effect working through induced policy adjustments as discussed in
Section 3.
Fig. 11 illustrates the relative importance of these two effects. The leftmost bar (denoted by ‘‘basis’’) indicates the
annual per-capita growth rate (net) along the balanced-growth path subject to year-2000 demographics. The other bars
indicate the predicted growth rates along the new balanced-growth path subject to p% and n% under different assumptions
about the adjustment of policy instruments. In particular, the bar denoted by ‘‘direct’’ indicates the new growth rate if only
the direct effect is accounted for (corresponding to gHððp%,n%Þ,kðp2000,n2000ÞÞ) and the bar denoted by ‘‘total ﬂex’’ indicates
the new growth rate if direct and indirect effects are accounted for (corresponding to gHððp%,n%Þ,kðp%,n%ÞÞ). The rightmost
bar denoted by ‘‘total ﬁxed’’ indicates the new growth rate if direct and indirect effects are accounted for but the
retirement age is held ﬁxed at its year-2000 value.
Fig. 11 shows that the direct effect is positive, summing to 57 basis points of annual growth. In contrast, the indirect
effect working through adjustments in policy is negative and amounts to roughly 10 basis points, due to higher transfers
and later retirement and in spite of higher public investment. With a capped retirement age, the indirect growth effect
would be much more negative (37 rather than 10 basis points), leaving a net growth increase of only 20 basis points.
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Fig. 12. Predicted change of the growth components for the rich OECD economy between the balanced-growth path around the year 2000 and the new
balanced-growth path. The labels c,1x,1ts,z,n and s refer to the components cðRÞap ,ð1xÞð1aÞp ,ð1tsÞap ,zðt,RÞap ,nap and sð1aÞp , respectively.
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Fig. 13. Predicted annual per-capita output growth rate for the rich OECD economy as deviation from the initial balanced-growth rate if growth is
exogenous and e¼ 0:5. The series at the bottom displays the growth deviation if Rt is capped at its year-2000 value.
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the retirement age would not improve growth prospects; to the contrary, it would go hand in hand with an even stronger
downward pressure on growth (more on this below).
Based on the expression for the growth rate in Eq. (5), Fig. 12 offers a different decomposition of the long-run growth
implications of demographic ageing. According to (5), changes in the growth rate result due to changes in six components,
namely
cðRÞap, ð1xÞð1aÞp, ð1tsÞap, zðt,RÞap, nap and sð1aÞp,
where p d=ð1að1dÞÞ.31 Fig. 12 shows that the components relating to labor supply (second component), the savings rate
(fourth component), capital deepening (ﬁfth component) and public investment (sixth component) contribute positively to
the growth acceleration while the components relating to the labor supply of the elderly (ﬁrst component) as well as the tax
wedge (third component) contribute negatively. The component relating to the beneﬁts of public investment, sð1aÞp
(displayed in the rightmost bar), experiences the strongest acceleration, increasing by more than 13%. Recall from our earlier
discussion that with a ﬁxed retirement age demographic ageing triggers a steep rise in social-security taxes and reduced
public investment (see Fig. 6). We conclude that with a capped retirement age, the strong negative indirect growth effect
discussed in the previous paragraph mainly is caused by crowding out of public investment.
In summary, the picture that emerges is only partly consistent with the view promoted by policy makers according to
which the political process will implement measures to raise productivity in order to ‘‘outgrow’’ the burden imposed by
demographic change. According to the model, demographic ageing indeed induces the political process to raise public
investment in order to foster productivity growth. However, the main positive effects on growth arise directly, through
capital deepening, a higher savings rate, and slightly increased labor supply and the net effect of endogenous policy on
growth is negative. Viewed in isolation, the increase of the retirement age works toward reducing growth. However, when
also considering the interaction with other policy instruments, ﬂexibility along the retirement margin plays a positive role31 Note that the decomposition in Fig. 12 compounds the direct and indirect effects distinguished in Fig. 11. For example, the component relating to
the savings rate, zðt,RÞap (displayed in the fourth bar), captures both direct and policy-intermediated growth effects of demographic change as they work
through the savings rate.
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investment would fall and the induced negative growth effects would be even stronger.
The central predictions of the model are robust to changes in the calibration. Modiﬁed values for the targeted balanced-
growth-path interest rate are mainly reﬂected in adjusted values for b and d, leaving the simulation results largely unchanged.
Reducing w renders the predicted increase of retirement age less pronounced andmore delayed. The effects on the decomposition
of the long-run change in gH are small but the growth cost of capping R is reduced. The most important parameter for calibration
purposes is the capital share a. Increasing a from 0.3 to 0.35 leaves the net long-run effect on gH largely unchanged but ampliﬁes
the positive and negative contributions to this long-run change through the different channels discussed earlier. The predicted
increase in retirement age is smaller if the capital share is high. If a is reduced to 0.25, the retirement age steeply increases
already before the year 2000. Starting from the high base value in the year 2000, the further increase of the retirement age does
not depress growth as strongly as in the baseline simulation and the net effect of endogenous policy on long-run growth becomes
positive. With a capped retirement age, the net effect of endogenous policy remains strongly negative.
The model predictions are also robust to replacing the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation by one of exogenous growth.
As discussed earlier, the equilibrium policy choices remain identical in such a variant of the model since the ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to kt are unchanged.32 To evaluate the robustness of the implied growth results, we simulate the
model with the exogenous-growth speciﬁcation introduced in Section 2.6. This model speciﬁcation can be calibrated based
on the same moment restrictions used previously, except for the one relating to the endogenous balanced-growth rate.
This latter restriction (which does not apply any longer if gH is determined by the exogenous gB1 ) can now be dropped and
the previously calibrated parameter in the production function for productivity growth imposed exogenously in the base
year 2000. As a result, the numerical values for the model parameters m, b, d and o are given by the values calibrated
previously and the parameter B1 in the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation is replaced by the sequence fB1,tg whose values
grow at the exogenous rate gB1 . Based on this modiﬁed calibration, we can compute the balanced exogenous-growth values
for the state variables in the base year, H2000 and q2000, and use the modiﬁed law of motion (6) to analyze the effect of the
parameter e on the growth implications of the demographic transition.
As illustrated in Fig. 13, which corresponds to e¼ 0:5, the medium-term growth implications are very similar to those in
the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation. With endogenous growth, annual per-capita growth in the rich OECD economy is
predicted to accelerate by 25–30 basis points in the year 2050 and 30–35 basis points in the year 2080 (see Fig. 10). With
exogenous growth and e¼ 0:5, in contrast, growth is predicted to accelerate by 25 basis points in the year 2050 before the
economy begins to revert to its long-run growth rate of gH ¼ ðgB1 Þ
1=ð1dÞð1eÞ. Lower values for e imply a smaller maximal
growth acceleration around the year 2050 and faster reversion thereafter. If e rises toward the limiting value of unity, the
growth dynamics increasingly mimic those of the endogenous-growth speciﬁcation. Finally, if the retirement age is
restricted not to rise beyond its value in the year 2000, per-capita growth remains stuck at its level in the year 2000, in
parallel to the outcome with endogenous growth (see Fig. 13).
In conclusion, the speciﬁcation of productivity growth in the model does not have a major bearing on the medium-term
transition dynamics of the economy and no effect at all on the short-, medium- and long-run evolution of the policy
instruments and the government budget shares in politico-economic equilibrium.335. Concluding remarks
We have presented a rich, yet tractable framework to analyze the impact of demographic ageing on economic growth.
Building on a standard overlapping-generations model, our framework combines various channels discussed in the literature
and referred to in the political debate. On the one hand, it captures the implications of rising longevity and falling fertility in
general equilibrium, including adjustments in the savings rate, labor supply, factor prices and capital deepening. On the other
hand, it captures responses by the political system, in particular adjustments of the size of the government budget and its
composition between investment and transfer spending as well as changes in the retirement age.
Calibrated versions of the model predict that annual per-capita growth in rich OECD economies will increase by roughly
30–35 basis points during the 21st century, with the positive direct growth effects of demographic ageing partly being
reversed by the consequences of endogenous policy responses. The model predictions support the view that rising
longevity paired with falling fertility increases the GDP-share of social-security transfers, with negative implications for
growth. However, they do not support the common view that rising social-security transfers crowd out productive public
investment (as a share of GDP). Crowding out only results in an extreme scenario where the political process adjusts tax
rates and the composition of government spending, but not the retirement age. In the more plausible scenario where the
political process adjusts instruments along all three margins, both social-security transfers and public investment as a
share of GDP rise, and the increase of the former is much more moderate than with a ﬁxed retirement age. These results
are robust to changes in the speciﬁcation of the source of economic growth.
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that the government runs a balanced budget, excluding government deﬁcits
and debt. This assumption is not very restrictive. In our model, unlike in Bassetto and Sargent (2006) who assume32 The latter result hinges on the assumption that households live for only two periods.
33 With exogenous growth, the long-run effect of the demographic transition on output is positive.
M. Gonzalez-Eiras, D. Niepelt / European Economic Review 56 (2012) 97–115 113commitment, public under-investment cannot be overcome by letting voters ﬁnance investment expenditures out of
government debt. For lack of commitment implies that the economic equivalence of social-security and debt policies
largely extends to the political sphere.34
We have also assumed that longevity and fertility are exogenous. While this assumption is useful for the purpose of
studying the long-run effects of demographic ageing on growth, there are clearly potential feedback effects from
government budgets to demographics, for example via investments in public health (see Hall and Jones, 2007). With
endogenous fertility, the demographic structure would turn into an endogenous state variable, rendering an analytical
solution of the policy game considered in the present paper infeasible. The magnitude of the feedback effects introduced
by endogenous fertility would depend on assumptions, among others, about the direction of altruistic linkages between
parents and children (Boldrin et al., 2005). We leave an analysis of these feedback effects for future research.Acknowledgements
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Appendix A. Production efﬁciency
For generality, productivity growth is speciﬁed as Htþ1 ¼ B1Heð1dÞt Idt with 0oer1. For eo1, the model does not display
endogenous growth.
Consider a path with constant n and p and let y denote output per worker. Conditional on Ht and aggregate labor supply,
we have
lnðytþ iþ1ÞCalnðktþ iþ1Þþdð1aÞ
Xi
j ¼ 0
ðeð1dÞÞjlnðItþ ijÞ, iZ0:
Starting from the investment policy fktþ iþ1,Itþ ig1i ¼ 0, consider a sequence of small reallocations of investment spending.
This sequence involves, in each period i, a small change in public investment of Di and a corresponding change in physical
investment of Di (per worker in period i). If this policy change weakly increases output in all subsequent periods, then it
amounts to a Pareto improvement and the initial allocation is production inefﬁcient. Formally, the conditions for
production inefﬁciency are given by
d lnðytþ iþ1Þ ¼a
Dtþ i
ktþ iþ1n
þdð1aÞ
Xi
j ¼ 0
ðeð1dÞÞj Dtþ ij
Itþ ij
¼a Itþ i
ktþ iþ1n
etþ iþdð1aÞ
Xi
j ¼ 0
ðeð1dÞÞjetþ ijZ0 for all iZ0,
where we deﬁne etþ i Dtþ i=Itþ i, and where at least one inequality must hold strictly. Since the initial allocation
corresponds to a balanced-growth path, the recurrent term
aa Itþ i
ktþ iþ1n
þdð1aÞ
is time-invariant. The conditions for production inefﬁciency can therefore be summarized as
aetZ0,
aetþ iþdð1aÞ
Xi
j ¼ 1
ðeð1dÞÞjetþ ijZ0 for all iZ1,
where at least one inequality must hold strictly.
Intuitively, the term a (multiplied by the amount of physical investment) represents the effect of an inﬁnitesimal
reallocation from k to H investment on output in the subsequent period. To increase output in period tþ1, et must have the
same sign as a. To increase output in periods later than period tþ1, the combined effect of the lagged changes in k- and
H-investment must be positive.
When a40, capital is over accumulated in the initial allocation. As is apparent from the above conditions, one can
generate a Pareto improvement in this case by reallocating resources from k to H (corresponding to etþ i40). Over
accumulation of capital is also present if a¼0 and eð1dÞ40, corresponding to the allocation in an economy without
government intervention, but with markets for the provision of the ‘‘public investment.’’35 In such a setting, savings is34 Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2010) analyze the economic and politico-economic equivalence of ﬁscal policies.
35 Boldrin and Montes (2005) and Docquier et al. (2007) characterize such an economy; they interpret public investment as public education.
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eð1dÞ40, the level of productivity contributes to future productivity growth, and a slight reallocation from k to H
investment therefore increases output in all later periods, as is apparent from the above conditions. The allocation satisfying
a¼0 is not Pareto optimal in this case because it does not properly account for the dynamic productivity externality.
When a is negative and large in absolute value, the allocation again is production inefﬁcient. In this case, a reallocation
of resources from H to k accumulation (corresponding to etþ io0) generates a Pareto improvement. For example, if a¼1,
a sequence of etþ i ¼ eo0 for all iZ0 increases production in all future periods because the positive effect from additional
physical investment, ae¼e40, dominates the cumulative negative effect from reduced productivity growth, dð1aÞPij ¼ 1
ðeð1dÞÞjeoe. To characterize the largest ao0 allowing for a persistent increase in output, we consider a sequence fe%tþ ig1i ¼ 0
with e%t o0 where fe%tþ ig1i ¼ 1 is recursively deﬁned by the requirement that dlnðytþ iÞ ¼ 0 for all iZ2. If such a sequence is
bounded then production is inefﬁcient. For iZ1, the terms of such a sequence satisfy ae%tþ iþdð1aÞ
Pi
j ¼ 1ðeð1dÞÞje%tþ ij ¼ 0.
This implies
e%tþ1 ¼
dð1aÞ
a eð1dÞe
%
t
and
e%tþ i ¼
dð1aÞ
a
Xi
j ¼ 1
ðeð1dÞÞje%tþ ij ¼
dð1aÞ
a eð1dÞe
%
tþ i1þ
dð1aÞ
a
Xi
j ¼ 2
ðeð1dÞÞje%tþ ij
¼ dð1aÞa eð1dÞe
%
tþ i1þ
dð1aÞ
a eð1dÞ
Xi1
j ¼ 1
ðeð1dÞÞje%tþ ij1 ¼
dð1aÞ
a eð1dÞe
%
tþ i1þeð1dÞe%tþ i1
¼ eð1dÞ 1dð1aÞ
a
 
e%tþ i1, i41:
Boundedness of the sequence and thus production inefﬁciency requires 1oeð1dÞð1dð1aÞ=aÞo1 which simpliﬁes (due to
ao0) to the condition aoð1aÞedð1dÞ=ð1eð1dÞÞ.
In conclusion, if eð1dÞ40 (such that a¼0 is not efﬁcient), the criterion for production efﬁciency is given by
ð1aÞedð1dÞ=ð1eð1dÞÞrao0 for a dð1aÞaI=kn. If the left inequality is violated, then the economy accumulates
too much H; if the right inequality is violated, then the economy accumulates too much k.
In politico-economic equilibrium, Itþ i=stþ i ¼ s=zð1tsÞ and the production efﬁciency criterion subject to e¼ 1
therefore reduces to
1Z
a0s
zð1tsÞ4d:
From the ﬁrst-order condition for s tax rates in politico-economic equilibrium satisfy
a0s
zð1tsÞ ¼
dabp
ð1þabpÞz ¼ d
að1þbpÞþð1aÞtþc1c
1þabp od,
where the last inequality follows from ðtþc1Þ=co1. We conclude that, in politico-economic equilibrium, the economy
necessarily over accumulates k relative to H.
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